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AUER 2.0: THE DISUNIFORM APPLICATION OF
AUER DEFERENCE AFTER KISOR V. WILKIE
Daniel Lutfy*
This Note examines how lower courts have applied Auer deference after
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie. The Court granted
certiorari in Kisor to answer one question: whether to overturn the
deference regimes created by Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. and
Auer v. Robbins. The Court upheld the doctrines and clarified their reach,
limits, and proper application. This Note focuses on Kisor’s holding
regarding the extent judges must scrutinize a regulation before concluding it
is ambiguous. Despite the Court’s attempt to explicate a standard, lower
courts have demonstrated stark differences in regulatory interpretation
before concluding a regulation is ambiguous for the purposes of Auer
deference. This Note highlights that disuniformity, explains its cause, and
offers its own interpretation of Kisor v. Wilkie.
This Note also identifies two causes of the disuniform application of Kisor.
First, different judges have different ideas of what “ambiguity” means. A
regulation that is 75 percent clear may be ambiguous to some judges but
unambiguous to others. Without resolving this problem, the Court used
conclusory terms to characterize the level of regulatory interpretation lower
courts should engage in. Those terms include “rigorous” and “exhaustive.”
Two courts can engage in the same “rigorous” or “exhaustive” regulatory
interpretation but disagree on whether the result of that process means a
regulation is “ambiguous.”
Second, the Court raised two competing values but did not clarify how to
resolve them. Competing with the requirement of “exhaustive” regulatory
interpretation is the idea that a deference regime facilitates the judiciary’s
respect for an agency’s policy discretion. But how does a court exhaustively
interpret a regulation and simultaneously defer to an agency’s policy
discretion? While the Court raised these two competing factors, it never
clarified how they precisely interact.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine this: you join the military at nineteen years old. Three years later,
you are stationed in Vietnam.1 You participate in Operation Harvest Moon.2

1. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019).
2. Id.
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At twenty-two years of age, you kill two enemy combatants.3 A friend dies.4
The memory of both torments you.5 Seventeen years later, at a time of
limited understanding of post-traumatic stress disorder,6 the Veterans
Administration (VA) denies your disability benefits.7 Twenty-five years
later, the VA recognizes your disability upon your submission for
reconsideration.8 However, the VA refuses to apply your disability benefits
retroactively based on the meaning of the word “relevant” in a complex
regulatory scheme.9 You appeal to federal court, equipped with your best
arguments to convince an independent judge. However, you learn you have
an uphill battle. The judge defers to the VA’s interpretation of the regulation
unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”10 The
court of appeals does not disagree with your interpretation or even try to
analyze what the regulation means.11 Instead, the court holds that the
“Board’s interpretation does not strike [it] as either plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the VA’s regulatory framework.”12 You lose.13
Against this factual background, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
overturning the deference regimes created by Auer v. Robbins14 and Bowles
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,15 under which courts defer to an agency’s
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.16 The Court unanimously
vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision but split 5-4 on whether to overturn
Auer deference.17 Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, refashioned Auer
deference by articulating new limits and tests for lower courts to apply.18 But
in doing so, a plurality of the Court reaffirmed the merits of Auer deference
as a matter of policy.19 Notably, the Court justified Auer deference on
separation of powers grounds.20 Because Congress vests policy discretion in
agencies, and because resolving ambiguities in regulations often entails
policy discretion, a deference regime respects the policy choices Congress
delegates to the executive branch.21
3. Brief for Petitioner at 14, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (No. 18-15), 2019
WL 338890, at *17.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 15.
7. Id. at 17.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 19.
10. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
11. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated sub nom. Kisor v.
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
15. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
16. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019).
17. Id.
18. See id. at 2414.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 2415.
21. Id.
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In refashioning Auer deference, the Court also limited the circumstances
where agencies deserve deference.22 One such requirement, which this Note
focuses on, is that a regulation be “genuinely ambiguous” before a court
accepts an agency’s interpretation.23 However, this Note shows that lower
courts, in interpreting Kisor, have vastly different ideas regarding the
meaning of genuine ambiguity.24
These two issues—respect for the executive branch’s policy discretion and
the meaning of genuine ambiguity—are central to this Note. While the Court
in Kisor cautioned lower courts to respect an agency’s policy discretion, it
also commanded lower courts to rigorously interpret regulations to avoid the
overapplication of deference.25 Kisor, therefore, has two competing values:
respect for the executive branch and the power of the judiciary to determine
issues of law.26 This Note addresses how lower courts have and should toe
that delicate balance when deciding to apply Auer deference.
Part I first gives the legal background for Auer and Seminole Rock
deference. Part II closely analyzes the majority and concurring opinions in
Kisor. Part III analyzes four lower court opinions that applied Kisor to
demonstrate its inconsistent application. Finally, Part IV weighs in on each
lower court opinion, explains their divergent outcomes, and offers an
explanation for the best reading of Kisor.
I. BACKGROUND OF AUER DEFERENCE
Part I.A explains the basic concept of Auer deference by analyzing three
cases that helped create the doctrine. Part I.B turns to how the Court limited
the application of the doctrine it created. Part I.C explains arguments against
Auer deference, and Part I.D highlights how judges openly called for the
Court to overturn Auer long before Kisor.
A. Auer Deference Defined
Few legal topics engender divisive scholarship like judicial deference to
an agency’s interpretation of a statute or its own regulations. Even the
majority opinion in Kisor and the principal concurrence disagree on the
doctrine’s origins.27 Therefore, rather than trying to unearth the history of
Auer deference, this Note instead explains foundational cases that morphed
the doctrine into its present state before Kisor.28

22. Id.
23. Id. at 2416.
24. See infra Part III (showing how lower courts interpret Kisor differently, in part
because each court has different ideas about the meaning of ambiguity).
25. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2410.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2411, 2426.
28. For a historical perspective, see Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing
the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 EMORY L.J. 47 (2015).
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Understanding the deference regime created by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.29 is a useful starting point.30 There,
the Court famously articulated the deference that courts should give to an
agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute.31 The basis for Chevron
deference is that Congress delegates power to agencies, not courts, to fill
“gaps” left in a statute.32 And agencies, rather than courts, are politically
capable of resolving policy issues.33 Therefore, agencies have the most
discretion when an interpretation of statute involves weighing competing
policy values.34 However, deference is only appropriate if Congress does not
directly speak on the matter in question.35 And in making that judgment,
courts should “utilize the traditional tools of statutory interpretation” to
ascertain Congress’s intent.36 If Congress speaks clearly on the matter, then
agencies do not deserve deference.37
Auer deference occurs when a court defers to an agency’s interpretation of
its own ambiguous regulation, as opposed to its interpretation of a statute.38
Like Chevron deference, Auer deference is premised on the idea that the
interpretation of a regulation involves “judgment grounded in policy
concerns”39 and a “sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial
branches.”40 Because Congress delegates lawmaking authority to agencies,
courts infer that Congress also delegates the power to agencies to resolve
ambiguities in the laws it promulgates.41 One unique feature of Auer
deference is the presumption that the agency will have greater knowledge
and understanding of its own regulatory text than the courts.42
29. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
30. The Court in Kisor borrowed language from Chevron in refashioning Auer deference,
namely that lower courts must “exhaust the traditional tools of statutory interpretation” before
deciding an agency’s interpretation deserves deference. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416. It is worth
considering if the Court’s reference to Chevron signaled a merger between the two doctrines.
31. This is commonly understood as a two-step approach. Courts must first determine if
Congress has spoken directly on the issue and, if Congress has not, courts only determine if
the agency based its interpretation on a permissible construction of the statute. See Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843.
32. Id. at 843–44.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 844.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 833 n.9.
37. Id. at 833.
38. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2019).
39. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
40. Id.
41. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412; see also Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1999) (“Because applying an agency’s regulation to complex or
changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and policymaking
prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a
component of the agency’s delegated law making powers.”). Solicitor General Noel
Francisco, at oral argument for Kisor, called Martin’s statement about congressional intent the
strongest ideological basis for Auer deference. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Kisor,
139 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 18-15).
42. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412 (stating that agencies are in a better position than courts
to “reconstruct” the meaning of a regulation).
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The first collectively agreed reference to judicial deference to an agency’s
regulations comes from dictum in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.43
Seminole Rock was a manufacturer of crushed stone, which was a regulated
commodity under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.44 In October of
1941, Seminole Rock contracted to sell crushed stone at $0.60 per ton, and
they delivered the stone in March of 1942.45 After the delivery, Seminole
Rock wanted to charge the same buyer an increased price on a subsequent
sale, but the administrator for the Office of Price Administration enjoined the
sale.46 Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 provided that manufacturers of
crushed stone could only make sales in March of 1942 at the same or a lower
price as prior sales in the same month.47
The government argued that, because Seminole Rock delivered the
crushed stone at $0.60 per ton in March of 1942, the subsequent sale was
subject to the regulation.48 Seminole Rock argued that the regulation only
applied if the sheet rock was charged and delivered in March of 1942. Since
Seminole Rock charged the contractor almost a full year in advance, it argued
the regulation should not apply.49
The Supreme Court held that the delivery of crushed stone, as opposed to
contract formation or when the charge occurred, triggered the regulation’s
effect.50 The definition of “highest price charged during March, 1942” meant
“the highest price which the seller charged to a purchaser . . . for delivery of
the same class of material during March, 1942.”51 The definition made the
delivery of the regulated commodity sufficient to trigger the regulation’s
effects since it explicitly referred to delivery.52
Prior to the Court’s textual analysis, the Court issued its famous dictum
about the proper procedure to interpret an agency’s regulation, which became
the basis for Auer deference:
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court
must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if
the meaning of the words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or
the principles of the Constitution in some situations may be relevant in the
first instance in choosing between various constructions. But the ultimate
criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.53

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

325 U.S. 410 (1945).
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id. at 413–14 (emphasis added).
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Despite the Court’s dictum, the Court independently analyzed the
regulation and concluded the agency’s position was correct.54 In fact, the
Court stated the agency’s interpretation was “consistent” with its own
independent analysis, which suggests that reference to the agency’s
interpretation was simply a way to buttress the Court’s position.55
Nevertheless, this dictum is the first clear iteration of the modern Auer
doctrine that the Court considered overturning in Kisor.
The most significant case after Seminole Rock is Auer v. Robbins56 itself.
The plaintiffs, members of a police force, argued that the City of St. Louis
improperly withheld overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (FLSA).57 The FLSA required overtime pay unless an employee
received a salary, and his employer could not deduct his pay based on
variances in quality and quantity of work.58 The plaintiffs claimed they were
subject to disciplinary procedures related to the “quality or quantity” of their
work.59
The secretary of labor submitted an amicus brief, in which he distinguished
between disciplinary reductions in pay and disciplinary adjustments, where
an official is reassigned, terminated, or demoted after a disciplinary
proceeding.60 The secretary believed that an employee must be subject to
discipline resulting in reductions in pay in the normal course of business, not
just as a response to a singular instance of misconduct.61 The secretary
believed the plaintiffs did not meet that standard because police officers
normally face discipline because of “one-time incident[s].”62
The Court, unlike in Seminole Rock, deferred to the secretary’s
interpretation before performing its own textual analysis.63 Instead of
analyzing the regulation, the Court simply stated that the secretary
permissibly interpreted the regulation.64 The Court never considered another
54. See Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference: Doubling Down on Delegation’s Defects, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 531, 550 (2018) (arguing that the Court “obviously would have reached the
same result in Seminole Rock with or without deference”). Cass further argues that Seminole
Rock is the most compelling case for administrative deference because the interpretation (1)
was during wartime about a wartime matter, (2) was made when the agency promulgated the
regulation and therefore the agency was positioned to reconstruct the regulation’s meaning,
(3) was widespread, and (4) was consistently applied. See id. In that context, Cass argues that
it is hard to imagine the broad dictum in Seminole Rock was meant to justify the modern form
of deference that exists today. See id. at 534.
55. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 417.
56. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). There is a lot of intervening history that is disputed but, for the
purposes of this Note, it is not relevant.
57. Id. at 455.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 461.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 460.
63. See id. at 462 (holding that the secretary’s interpretation deserved deference because
it was a reasonable interpretation). The Court did not determine if the secretary’s reading was
the “best” reading, like it did in Seminole Rock. See Cass, supra note 54, at 547 (arguing that
the Court in Auer relied on a deference regime instead of its own regulatory interpretation).
64. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
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interpretative argument.65 This method of applying deference dramatically
differed from what happened in Seminole Rock, but it became the foundation
for regulatory deference moving forward.66
As case law developed, the Court’s formulation of Auer deference
sharpened. At its height, the Court used the doctrine to avoid getting in the
weeds of regulatory interpretation.67 In Decker v. Northwest Environmental
Defense Center,68 the Court stated that an agency’s interpretation of a
regulation deserves deference, even if inferior to its adversary’s
interpretation.69 That iteration of deference toward agencies is a far cry from
the application of deference in Seminole Rock.70 This Note addresses, in part,
how Kisor’s formulation of Auer deference represents a shift from the
Court’s prior iterations of Auer in Decker.71
B. Limitations on the Application of Auer Deference
While Auer deference became a powerful tool, the Court has imposed
judicially created limits on its application.72 First, Auer deference is not
warranted if the agency’s ambiguous regulation is just a restatement of the
statute creating the agency or granting it powers.73 Second, Auer deference
is inappropriate when an interpretation of a regulation does not reflect the
agency’s fair and considered judgment.74 An interpretation that conflicts
65. Id.
66. See Cass, supra note 54, at 548–49. Specifically, the Court stated that the secretary’s
view “cannot be said to be unreasonable.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 459. Unlike in Seminole Rock,
where the agency’s interpretation was “consistent” with the Court’s reasoning, the Court in
Auer cloaked the secretary of labor’s interpretation as “reasonable” according to a nonexistent
underlying standard. Id. That is, no underlying regulatory analysis defined the bounds of
reasonableness. Id. This method of applying Auer deference justifies deference to an agency’s
interpretation of a regulation by nothing more than the ipse dixit of the court. According to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert cannot draw conclusions based on data without
explaining his reasoning; in other words, courts will not accept conclusions “only by the ipse
dixit of the expert.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). Similarly, courts
should explain why a regulation is ambiguous and why an agency’s interpretation is
reasonably within the zone of ambiguity.
67. See United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (deferring to the government
because of the existence of regulations without engaging in interpretation).
68. 568 U.S. 597 (2013).
69. See id. at 613 (“It is well established that an agency’s interpretation need not be the
only possible reading of a regulation—or even the best one—to prevail.”).
70. See Cass, supra note 54, at 561.
71. There are several iterations of the Auer rule that the Court proffered before Kisor
which excuse courts from difficult regulatory interpretation. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v.
Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 274–75 (2009) (“The agency’s interpretation
is not ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’; and so we accept it as correct.”
(quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461)). The Court “accepted” the interpretation as correct rather
than, as the Court did in Seminole Rock, conclude the agency’s interpretation was “consistent”
with its own independent interpretation. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
72. Most, if not all, of these limitations are difficult to apply universally because the
exceptions raise more questions than they answer. See Kristin E. Hickman & Mark R.
Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L. REV. 103, 105–06 (2019).
73. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (holding that a regulation that
“parrots” a statute is undeserving of Auer deference).
74. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012).
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with a prior interpretation, or is merely a “convenient litigating position,”
will not receive Auer deference.75 Third, Auer deference is inappropriate if
the agency’s interpretation amounts to an “unfair surprise” which disrupts
the regulated parties’ expectations about the law.76 Lastly, since Auer
deference is premised on an agency’s superior expertise, it may be
inappropriate when the regulations involve legal concepts rather than a
choice between competing policy values.77
C. Arguments Against Auer Deference
Since Kisor squarely confronted the question of whether to overturn Auer
deference, it is worth considering the general arguments against it.78
Arguments against Auer deference track three lines: (1) statutory, (2)
constitutional, and (3) policy.
First, deference to administrative agencies may conflict with the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706 directs the judiciary to
“decide all relevant questions of law.”79 Despite that directive, Auer
deference holds that agencies, not courts, authoritatively resolve ambiguities
in their regulations.80
Second, when the executive branch weighs in on the interpretative process,
it invades the judiciary’s power to say what the law is.81 In a normal case or
controversy, a judge independently adjudicates a dispute between two
litigants.82 But when an agency seeks deference, a judge delegates his Article
III power to one of the parties,83 and one of those parties is often the
executive branch.84 This amounts to a violation of separation of powers.85
75. Id.
76. Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2019) (refusing to apply Auer deference
for that reason).
77. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2442–43 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(explaining that agency expertise is not a talisman for applying Auer deference because a court
should consider the agency’s expertise in Skidmore deference). Moreover, Justice Gorsuch
argued that judges are capable of sifting through complicated regulatory schemes and issues
without reflexively relying on deference as a substitute for thoughtful analysis. See id. at 2443.
78. For arguments supporting Auer deference, see infra Part II.B.
79. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretation of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 621 (1996).
80. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 110 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Moreover, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that deference regimes skirt the notice-and-comment
requirements for informal rulemaking because agencies can pass binding rules under Auer
deference instead. See id. (noting that agencies are supposed to use notice-and-comment
rulemaking to pass binding rules).
81. See id. at 124 (Thomas, J., concurring).
82. Id.
83. Justice Kagan rejected the argument that Auer deference violated separation of powers
principles because the limits she imposed on the doctrine retained for the judiciary a proper
interpretive role. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2421 (2019).
84. Judicial deference can arise in a case between two private litigants when an agency
files an amicus brief.
85. Accord Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d. 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (stating that Auer deference “certainly seems to have added prodigious new
powers to an already titanic administrative state”); see Manning, supra note 79, at 682 (“The
concerns about unchecked power that animate the separation norm surely have no less, and
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Moreover, unlike the judiciary, the executive branch lacks the structural
protections afforded by Article III to federal judges, such as salary protection
or lifetime tenure, which subjects the executive branch to shifting political
motivations.86
Third, Auer deference may be unwarranted because the political elements
of administrative agencies shift from administration to administration.87 A
core basis for Auer deference is that an agency is better situated to resolve an
ambiguity than the judiciary because of its expertise.88 However, agency
personnel changes frequently, and an agency’s focus in implementing the law
changes as presidential administrations change.89 Just as a later Congress’s
actions have no bearing on what an enacting Congress meant or intended in
a statute, an agency’s postenactment interpretation of a regulation does not
offer insight to the enacting agency’s intent.90
D. Open Calls to Overturn Auer Deference
Doubts about Auer surfaced in various opinions leading to Kisor. Justice
Antonin Scalia, who wrote the unanimous opinion in Auer, directly called for
overturning the doctrine in a 2012 concurrence.91 Three justices in Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n92 openly called for a future case that presented the
question of whether to overrule Auer deference.93 In 2016, Justice Thomas
dissented from a denial of a writ of certiorari and explicitly asked the Court
to consider overruling Auer deference.94 Similarly, in 2016, then Judge
Gorsuch concurred in a Tenth Circuit opinion, suggesting that the Court
overturn Auer and Chevron deference.95 He echoed many of the arguments
made by Justice Scalia and foreshadowed the arguments in his Kisor

perhaps far more, purchase in a complex twentieth-century society whose government
pervades our daily lives in a way that few could have imagined in 1787.”); see also Phillip B.
Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the “Doctrine” of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592,
601 (1986).
86. See Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. at 124 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2441 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
88. See id. at 2412 (majority opinion).
89. See id. at 2441 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
90. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the premise “that the correctness of statutory construction is to be measured by
what the current Congress desires, rather than by what the law as enacted meant”). Justice
Scalia pointed out that legislative deals rely on quid pro quos, so the judiciary cannot look in
isolation as to what a certain majority “wants” because the majority must always give and take
certain provisions or aspects of a new law to get it passed. See id.
91. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. 575 U.S. 92 (2015).
93. Justices Scalia and Thomas called for Auer to be overturned, while Justice Alito did
not pass judgment but “await[ed] a case in which the validity of Seminole Rock may be
explored through full briefing and argument.” Id. at 108 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring).
94. See United Student Air Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (collecting opinions arguing to overturn Auer deference).
95. Gutierrez-Bruizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
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concurrence.96 Most recently, federal appellate judges called for the Court
to overturn Auer deference while Kisor was pending on appeal.97 Rancor
from lower courts and even the Court itself set the stage for a case like Kisor
to be decided.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN KISOR V. WILKIE: AUER TESTED AT
THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Majority and Plurality Opinions
Justice Kagan authored a four-part opinion.98 After recounting the factual
background of the case, the Court explained Auer deference and justified the
doctrine on ideological grounds.99 The Court then acknowledged the various
circumstances in which Auer deference is unwarranted.100 Chief Justice
Roberts, who concurred and was the fifth vote to uphold the doctrine, joined
in the part of the Court’s opinion that limited Auer deference but did not join
in the part of the Court’s opinion that justified Auer deference on ideological
grounds.101
After justifying Auer deference, the Court rejected Kisor’s arguments on
statutory, policy, and constitutional grounds.102 A plurality of the Court
upheld Auer deference for several reasons, but a majority, created by Chief
Justice Roberts, upheld it only on stare decisis grounds.103 Therefore, a
majority of the Court agreed only on the limitations on the application of
Auer deference and on its survival based on stare decisis.104
B. Justifying Auer Deference
Justice Kagan, for the plurality, identified the context where Auer
deference thrives: where a regulation is genuinely ambiguous and the
resolution of that ambiguity requires policy decision-making rather than
textual or statutory interpretation.105 One of the four examples she cited
involved a regulation that required arenas to ensure the disabled had
comparable lines of sight to the general public.106 The issue presented was
whether arenas, in ensuring “lines of sight comparable” for the disabled, had

96. Compare id. at 1153 (“[T]he problem remains that courts are not fulfilling their duty
to interpret the law . . . .”), with Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2439 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (finding that Auer deference “compromise[s] our judicial independence”).
97. See Forrest Gen. Hosp. v. Azar, 926 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v.
Havis, 907 F.3d 439, 441 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J., concurring), rev’d en banc, 927 F.3d 382
(6th Cir. 2019).
98. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408.
99. Id. at 2410.
100. Id. at 2414.
101. Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
102. Id. at 2421–22 (majority opinion).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2410.
106. Id.
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to consider standing spectators.107 Because the text of the regulation did not
answer this problem and the resolution of the ambiguity required policy
considerations, this situation exemplified appropriate deference to an
agency’s policy discretion.108
Next, Justice Kagan affirmed the presumption that Congress wants
agencies, not courts, to resolve ambiguities in regulations.109 She
acknowledged that Congress never explicitly assigned that responsibility to
agencies.110 But since Congress delegated lawmaking authority to the
agencies, the Court inferred that Congress also wanted agencies to resolve
ambiguities in the regulations they promulgate.111
The Court then explained the ideological justification for that
presumption.112 Agencies are better positioned than courts to “reconstruct”
a regulation’s original meaning.113 The agency’s insight can provide clarity
on the rule’s original intent.114 If an interpretive question presents a new
problem that the agency could not have predicted, then the agency’s specific
intention is still useful to consider the similar issues the drafters faced.115
More importantly for the purposes of this Note, the Court stressed that
Auer deference is grounded on the premise that resolving regulatory
ambiguity involves judgment of policy considerations.116 In reference back
to the sports arena example, Justice Kagan noted the cost-benefit calculation
an agency would consider to resolve the question.117 An agency would have
to consider the cost to arenas of creating comparable lines of sight for the
disabled that take into account standing spectators and then compare that to
the goal of equal treatment for the disabled.118 The cost-benefit analysis
“sound[ed] more in policy than in law.”119
Judges might also have no familiarity or experience in the policy
considerations agencies must consider to resolve a regulatory ambiguity.120
Agencies often have greater expertise than judges, either because of scientific

107. Id.
108. Id. For example, an agency had to consider the purpose of the regulation (to benefit
the disabled) in conjunction with the financial considerations of the arenas (how much it would
cost the arenas to consider standing spectators). Id. To the plurality, the answer to that
consideration “sounded more in policy than law.” Id.
109. Id. at 2412.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2413.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The difficulty in applying Justice Kagan’s opinion is figuring out which
interpretative problems “sound more in policy than in law.” See infra Part IV.E.
120. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413.
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or technical knowledge.121 Congress tasks agencies to use their expertise to
fill in statutory gaps, and a deference regime effectuates that intent.122
Justice Kagan closed out this section with a policy argument. Auer
deference allows uniformity in the interpretation of regulations.123 Judges
are likely to interpret regulations differently because of their lay perspective,
whereas an agency speaks with one voice.124 In Auer itself, the circuit courts
of appeals came to divergent conclusions regarding whether police officers
deserved overtime pay.125 Therefore, Auer deference serves an import role
in the uniformity of federal regulatory law.126
C. Limitations on Auer Deference
The Court, now with a majority of justices, provided a five-part test that a
regulation must pass to warrant the application of Auer deference.127 This
Note focuses only on the first two parts of the test. Before giving the test,
the Court noted that, in the past, it applied Auer deference reflexively,
without any interpretive analysis of the underlying regulation.128 This
practice gave Kisor “a bit of grist for his claim” that Auer deference grants
agencies too much authority.129 After that acknowledgement, Justice Kagan
assured that the subsequent limitations on Auer deference avoided the
problems Kisor raised.130
First, a regulation must be genuinely ambiguous.131 To determine whether
a regulation is ambiguous, courts should “exhaust all the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation.”132 A court cannot conclude that a regulation is
ambiguous unless it empties its “legal toolkit” and there is still no correct
The “legal toolkit” involves considering a
interpretive answer.133
regulation’s text, structure, and history.134 A regulation is not ambiguous
merely because its resolution requires difficult interpretative analysis since
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 2414.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. For Auer deference, the five-part test requires that (1) a regulation is genuinely
ambiguous, (2) the agency’s interpretation is within the “zone of ambiguity,” (3) the agency’s
interpretation is its official position, (4) the agency’s interpretation implicates its expertise,
and (5) the agency’s interpretation reflects its “fair and considered” judgment. See id. at 2415–
17.
128. Id. at 2414. One example of this practice is from Auer itself. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
129. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414.
130. Id. at 2415. It is a fair inference that, if the Court acknowledged that a method of
applying Auer deference justified arguments that Auer deference is unconstitutional, then the
Court probably did not endorse that method of Auer’s application. Therefore, Kisor should
be read to repudiate the application of Auer deference without a court’s independent analysis
of the underlying regulation. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
131. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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thorough analysis can resolve purported ambiguities.135 However, Justice
Kagan never clarified what “ambiguous” means or how ambiguous a
regulation must be to proceed to the next step of analysis.136
But in engaging in genuine regulatory interpretation, courts should not
invade an agency’s policy discretion.137 Here, Justice Kagan differentiated
between “law” and “policy” without defining either term.138 When a court
fully utilizes its legal toolkit and has cannot come to an interpretative answer,
“the law runs out, and policy-laden choice is what is left over.”139 This
implies that courts should not declare that a regulation is ambiguous until
they analyze the underlying regulation.140 Courts are to determine legal
questions relating to regulations, but agencies have discretion to administer
policy. Simply put, if a court cannot come to an interpretative answer, the
problem sounds in policy rather than law.141 But the Court ultimately gave
no guidance about the precise contours of “policy” and “legal” questions, so
lower courts have to determine which questions are more appropriately
answered by agencies and which questions the judiciary retains power to
adjudicate.
If a court decides that a regulation is ambiguous, even after it has emptied
its legal toolkit, it must be satisfied that the agency’s interpretation is within
the “zone of ambiguity.”142 This is because, although a regulation might be
ambiguous, the agency’s interpretive choice might be an unreasonable
conclusion despite the ambiguity.143 The interpretive analysis in step one
creates the outer limits of reasonability in step two.144 And the Court ensured
that this is a step an agency can fail.145
135. See id. (“A regulation is not ambiguous merely because ‘discerning the only possible
interpretation requires a taxing inquiry.’ To make that effort, a court ‘must carefully consider
the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no
agency to fall back on.’” (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting))). This excerpt strongly suggests that lower courts should perform an
interpretive analysis before and independent of any Auer analysis.
136. This is problematic because judges will disagree about whether to apply Auer
deference because they have different understandings of the meaning of “ambiguity.” A
regulation could be ambiguous if it is 90 percent clear, 75 percent clear, or 50 percent clear,
depending on the personal opinion of the adjudicator. See generally Ward Farnsworth et al.,
Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 257 (2010).
137. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. Justice Gorsuch argues that a judge will always come to an answer for any
interpretative problem, no matter how difficult the process is or if one interpretation is
narrowly better than another. See id. at 2429–30 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that legal
arguments are never in equipoise).
142. Id. at 2416 (majority opinion).
143. Id.
144. Id. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that lower courts should perform an
interpretive analysis even if they decide that a regulation is ambiguous. The interpretive
analysis is necessary to determine if an agency’s interpretation of its regulation is within the
zone of ambiguity.
145. See id.

2020]

AUER 2.0

2025

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Alito
concurred in the judgment but supported overturning Auer deference.146
While Justice Gorsuch made several arguments—ranging from statutory to
constitutional to policy—this section focuses on his arguments related to the
first two steps of the test to apply Auer deference.
Justice Gorsuch argued that the first requirement of Auer deference, that a
regulation be genuinely ambiguous, is an amorphous concept incapable of
consistent application.147 The Court has never defined what “ambiguity”
means and how ambiguous a regulation must be to go to the next step.148
Justice Gorsuch cited to a book review written by then Judge Kavanaugh in
2016.149 In it, Kavanaugh argued that judges have different thresholds of
ambiguity.150 If he concluded a statute was 65 percent clear, he would
conclude the regulation is clear, but other judges might conclude that it was
ambiguous.151 And no case or doctrine indicates which conclusion is
correct.152 To Justice Gorsuch, this confusion invariably causes disuniform
application of Auer deference.153
Justice Gorsuch also highlighted that Auer deference is only meaningful if
it compels a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation and the agency’s
interpretation is otherwise incorrect.154 Since step one of Kisor requires
rigorous statutory interpretation, a court should be able to determine the
superior interpretation.155 But if a court decides in step one that the agency
interpreted the regulation correctly, Auer deference is not applied.156 It is
only applied if the agency’s interpretation is incorrect and the regulation is
ambiguous enough to warrant deference nonetheless.157 This, to Justice
Gorsuch, violates constitutional precepts of separation of powers.158
Meanwhile, Chief Justice Roberts provided the key fifth vote to uphold
Auer deference.159 However, he did not envision that Auer deference could

146. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2430.
149. See id. at 2430 n.34 (citing Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129
HARV. L. REV. 2116 (2016) (book review)); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (stating that the fundamental
flaw in deference regimes is that there is no definition of ambiguity).
150. Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2116, 2134–44
(2016) (book review).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2430 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 2429. Justice Gorsuch does not believe legal arguments are ever in “true
equipoise,” and a court can always use interpretive tools to come to an answer, even if the
right interpretation comes after a difficult interpretive inquiry. See id.
155. Id. This is because courts across the country, across a host of legal issues, manage to
come to answers every day on difficult legal issues. Id. There is no reason why regulatory
interpretation is any different. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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be used to save a failing agency interpretation.160 He stated that the distance
between Justice Kagan’s and Justice Gorsuch’s opinions was “not as great as
it may initially appear,” even though one opinion called for upholding the
doctrine and one called for overturning it.161 This is because, while Justice
Gorsuch concluded that agency expertise should merely have persuasive
power, the limits on Auer’s scope reduced it to situations where the agency’s
interpretation would be persuasive and it would be unreasonable for a court
to conclude otherwise.162 But, as Justice Gorsuch pointed out, this
interpretation of Kisor would render Auer deference meaningless because it
would only apply when a judge is otherwise persuaded of the agency’s
interpretation.163 It would be pointless to have such a deference regime.164
Justice Kavanaugh concurred, making one relevant criticism of Justice
Kagan’s distinction between law and policy.165 Regulations that require
policy analysis use terms like “reasonable,” “appropriate,” “feasible,” or
“practical.”166 He agreed that analysis of those regulations requires a court
to consider policy.167 But courts should not resolve those policy questions
under the auspice of Auer deference.168 Auer deference should be restricted
to legal interpretation, not considerations of policy.169 Using that distinction,
he concluded that a judge can simultaneously engage in “rigorous scrutiny”
of an ambiguous regulation under Auer deference, while deferring to an
agency’s policy choices using the standard of review in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.170
III. APPLICATION OF KISOR IN THE LOWER COURTS
Application of Kisor in the lower courts, regardless of the disposition, can
be categorized into three groups of reasoning171: (1) decisions that do not
engage in rigorous regulatory analysis before concluding that the regulation
is ambiguous for the purposes of Auer deference; (2) decisions that engage
in rigorous statutory interpretation of regulations that use policy-laden terms
like “appropriate” or “necessary” before deciding whether to apply Auer
deference; and (3) decisions that engage in statutory interpretation of
regulations that do not use policy-laden terms.

160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2424–25.
163. See id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 2448–49.
167. Id. at 2449.
168. See id. (stating that policy review of an agency’s actions is governed by Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)). This is commonly known as State Farm review.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. These are categories this Note creates.
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A. Decisions That Do Not Rigorously Analyze a Regulation Before
Applying Auer Deference
1. Trawler Carolina Lady, Inc. v. Ross
Courts sometimes recognize a difficult conflict between two competing
interpretations and conclude that the regulation is ambiguous because of that
conflict. One example of this practice, in Trawler Carolina Lady, Inc. v.
Ross,172 involved sea scallop regulation in North Carolina.173 The plaintiff
challenged the denial of his application to transfer scallop fishing permits.174
Congress empowered the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to
regulate overfishing.175 For scallop fishing, the NMFS instituted a “limited
access” system, which drastically reduced the amount of new vessels
permitted to fish scallops.176 The limited permit included a “days at sea”
limitation (DAS), which was defined as “each 24-hour period of time during
which a fishing vessel is absent from port for purposes of scallop fishing.”177
In this case, the plaintiff sold a vessel to another company, whose president
appeared to have familial or personal ties to the plaintiff.178 The plaintiff,
however, retained the vessel’s permit and DAS allocation and fished for
scallops with another vessel using that permit.179 The buyer used his own
permit and DAS allocation for the vessel he bought from the plaintiff.180
Then, the plaintiff transferred the permit he had retained to another vessel he
owned that was damaged the previous year.181 After the plaintiff
repurchased the vessel he originally sold, he attempted to transfer the permit
back to that vessel.182
The agency denied the transfer because of “the apparent lack of full
consideration” and “the historical pattern of maneuvering permits” between
the two companies.183 Specifically, the agency pointed to 50 C.F.R.
§ 648.14(i)(2)(iv)(B), which makes it unlawful for “any one person” to
“combine, transfer, or consolidate DAS allocations.”184
The parties disputed what “any one person” meant.185 The plaintiff relied
on a 1994 opinion letter from the agency that drew a distinction between a
“person” consolidating a DAS allocation and a “vessel” consolidating a DAS

172. No. 4:19-CV-19, 2019 WL 3213537 (E.D.N.C. July 16, 2019).
173. See generally id.
174. Id. at *1.
175. Id. at *3.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *4.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. In a July 2018 decision letter, the agency interpreted “any one person” to include
transfers between vessels. Id. at *5.
185. Id.
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allocation.186 Using that distinction, the plaintiff argued that the regulation
only prohibited consolidating multiple DAS allocations in one vessel.187 It
did not prohibit a vessel from fishing under two different DAS allocations
after the first was expended.188 Therefore, the sole question was whether the
regulation prohibited a vessel from fishing under different DAS allocations
or whether it only prohibited consolidating multiple DAS allocations in one
vessel.189
The plaintiff cited two different regulations to support his argument.190
The regulations provided that an owner who is issued a permit is limited to
one replacement vessel per year and that permits are presumed to transfer
vessels whenever they are bought and sold.191 Those two regulations implied
that a vessel may fish under two different DAS allocations at different times
and thus the agency improperly denied the plaintiff’s DAS transfer.192
The court, however, deferred to the agency’s interpretation of the
regulation.193 The court cited the two conflicting principles from Kisor.194
While courts presume that Congress intends for agencies to resolve their
ambiguities, they cannot ignore the plain language of a regulation.195 The
court stated it did not need to apply Auer deference to determine that the
agency had the authority to deny the plaintiff’s application.196 But it did
apply Auer deference in response to the conflict created by the two
regulations that the plaintiff cited.197
The court held the regulations cited by the plaintiff did not
“unambiguously require a different result” but created, at best, a “genuine
ambiguity” calling for Auer deference.198 The two regulations did not crossreference the general prohibition on DAS allocations so the structure of the
regulatory scheme was ambiguous.199 Although the two regulations cited by
the plaintiff suggested a vessel could have multiple permits, they did not
clearly limit the scope of the general prohibition against DAS allocation.200
And without that clear interaction, the effect of the general prohibition on
DAS allocation was ambiguous. The court did not undertake an independent

186. Id.
187. Id. at *12.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at *13.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. The Western District of Virginia imposed a similar burden in Spencer v.
Macado’s, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 3d 545, 552 (W.D. Va. 2019). There, the court held that a
regulation was genuinely ambiguous because the regulation did not “unambiguously” define
a word in the regulation. Id.
199. Trawler, 2019 WL 3213537, at *13.
200. Id.
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analysis of the regulatory structure before its application of Auer
deference.201
In the next paragraph, the court held that the regulation’s text, structure,
and context supported the agency’s reading.202 But it held that only after
stating the plaintiff’s arguments did not “unambiguously foreclose” the
Therefore, it is unclear whether the court
agency’s position.203
independently analyzed the regulation or analyzed it only to the extent
necessary to determine whether to apply Auer deference.204 Even if the court
made those conclusions independent of Auer deference, it never resolved
how the regulations that plaintiff cited influenced the meaning of the general
prohibition on DAS allocations.205
2. Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Associates II PC
The Third Circuit in Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Associates
II PC206 deferred to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation without
interpreting the underlying regulation itself.207 In this case, the plaintiff
alleged a violation of the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 by failing to provide
certain disclosures before lending the plaintiff credit.208 The plaintiff
underwent surgery and, prior to the surgery, he signed an agreement that
stated he would pay his deductible before the operation.209 The day before
his surgery, he told his doctor that he could not pay.210 Both parties agreed
orally that the plaintiff would pay his deductible through a payment plan of
$100 per month after a $200 down payment.211 Although it was an oral
agreement, the defendant sent a confirmation e-mail to the plaintiff.212
The pertinent regulation (“Regulation Z”) required a “creditor” to make
certain disclosures before the “consummation” of a credit transaction but
only if the parties used a “written agreement.”213 The parties disputed the
meaning of “written agreement.”214 The plaintiff argued that “emails either
constitute a writing for purposes of [the regulation] or are indicative of a
separate written agreement between the parties.”215 The Federal Reserve
Board (the “Board”) believed that a written credit agreement requires more

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
935 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2019).
See generally id.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. at 203.
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than an “informal workout arrangement” of a debt, which cannot include “a
letter that merely confirms an oral agreement.”216
The court first discussed the Board’s longstanding interpretation of the
requirements of a written agreement.217 Namely, the Board always required
a level of formality and for the agreement to be “executed by the
customer.”218 The email confirmation sent to the plaintiff was not “formal”
and the plaintiff did not execute or sign the agreement.219 Rather, his father
negotiated the payment plan.220 Therefore, if the court deferred to the
agency, the plaintiff would lose.221
Without independently interpreting the regulation, the court concluded
that the Board’s interpretation of Regulation Z deserved deference.222 The
court began by citing Kisor for the proposition that Congress wants agencies
to play the primary role in interpreting ambiguous regulations.223 It also
characterized Auer deference as a “presumption” that must be rebutted by the
party arguing against an agency’s interpretation.224 It then listed the formal
five-part test that Kisor created to determine whether or not to apply Auer
deference to an ambiguous regulation.225
The court first determined whether the regulation was genuinely
ambiguous.226 The statute did not define a “written agreement.”227 The court
considered two conflicting arguments: (1) the plain language of the
regulation suggested that parties must fully integrate the extension of credit
in writing and (2) background principles of contract law only require the
essential terms of the agreement to be in writing.228 Based solely on those
two arguments, the court concluded that, “in light of those conflicting
principles—the plain text of the regulation and the background of state law—
the term ‘written agreement’ is ambiguous.”229 The court did not
independently analyze the regulation because, at first glance, it was
ambiguous enough to warrant deference.230 This method of applying
deference resembles Auer more than Seminole Rock.231
After the court determined that the regulation was genuinely ambiguous,
it had to determine whether the agency’s interpretation fell within the zone
of ambiguity referenced in Kisor.232 The court held the Board’s
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Id.
See id. at 204 n.104.
Id. at 204–05.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part I.A.
Wolfington, 935 F.3d at 205.
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interpretation was reasonable because the Board relied on the regulation’s
plain language.233 The plaintiff argued that the interpretation was
unreasonable because it incentivized creditors to merely send confirmation
e-mails or letters, thereby subverting the protections in the statute.234 But the
court rejected this argument because (1) the plaintiff had no evidence that
this occurred and (2) the “zone of ambiguity” from Kisor was broad enough,
regardless, to include the Board’s interpretation.235
B. Rigorous Statutory Interpretation of Regulations Using Policy-Laden
Terms
On the other end of the spectrum of Kisor’s application are decisions that
engage in thorough interpretation, even for terms like “appropriate” or
“necessary.” In Romero v. Barr,236 the Fourth Circuit considered whether
the attorney general misread pertinent regulations in ruling that immigration
judges (IJs) cannot administratively close cases, a practice dating back to the
1980s.237
The plaintiff, an undocumented immigrant, faced removal proceedings by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2013.238 The plaintiff
moved for the IJ to administratively close his case so that he could seek
alternative immigration remedies (e.g., a provisional unlawful presence
waiver).239 The IJ denied his motion.240 The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) reversed and then administratively closed his case.241 The DHS
moved for reconsideration and, in the interim, the attorney general in 2017
issued a precedential decision stating that no regulation grants IJs or the BIA
authority to administratively close cases.242 Following this, the BIA granted
the motion for reconsideration, dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, and ordered
his deportation.243 The Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the attorney general
properly read the pertinent regulations.244
Before the attorney general’s decision, IJs and the BIA administratively
closed cases pursuant to two broad regulations.245 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b)
allows IJs to take “any action consistent with their authority” that is
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 205–06, 206 n.116.
236. 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019).
237. Administrative closure refers to when an IJ “temporarily removes a case from the
active docket as a matter of ‘administrative convenience.’” Id. at 287. The closure
“temporarily pause[s] removal proceedings and places the case on hold, generally because
there is an alternate form of case resolution pending, or because the case may be affected by
events outside of the control of either party or that may not occur for some time.” Id.
238. Id. at 286.
239. Id. at 287.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 288.
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“appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases.”246 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) allows the BIA to take “any action consistent with their
authorities under the Act and the regulations that is appropriate and
necessary for the disposition of such cases.”247
In his precedential opinion, the attorney general held that neither of those
regulations confer power upon IJs to administratively close cases.248 The
attorney general concluded that the indefinite suspension of a case is not an
action that is “appropriate and necessary for the disposition” of such a
case.249 Moreover, the attorney general found that administrative closures
dramatically increased between 2011 and 2017, eclipsing closures in the time
period between 1980 and 2011.250 Lastly, the attorney general held that
administrative closures are contrary to the public interest because “every
delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to
remain in the United States.”251
The Fourth Circuit read sections 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) as
expansively as the plain language allowed by using the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation.252 The court interpreted “any action” in the
regulations to include docket management, which included administrative
closure.253 Therefore, since IJs and the BIA could take “any action,” the only
question was whether the attorney general erred by concluding that
administrative closure is never appropriate or necessary.254
The court then considered whether to defer to the attorney general’s
interpretation.255 The court cited Kisor only for the proposition that courts
have the duty to independently analyze regulations before applying Auer
deference.256 Rejecting the attorney general’s interpretation and not
applying Auer deference, the court interpreted “appropriate and necessary”
through a textual lens.257 The court noted that “appropriate and necessary”
were terms that require a context-specific inquiry.258 If the court could find
one situation where administrative closure was “appropriate” or “necessary,”
in the court’s judgment, then administrative closure fit within text of the
regulations.259 It then identified one context in which administrative closure
could be appropriate or necessary and cited one case to illustrate its point.260
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See generally In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
249. Id. at 284 (“Administrative closure in fact is the antithesis of a final disposition.”).
250. Id. at 273.
251. See id. at 288–89 (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992)).
252. Romero, 937 F.3d at 292.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 291–92.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 293 (stating that words like “appropriate” and “necessary” are capacious).
259. Id.
260. See id. (citing In re Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 2012)); see also id. at 294
(“As Avetisyan illustrates, administrative closure may—contrary to the Attorney General’s
argument . . . in fact facilitate the timely resolution of an issue or case.”).
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In that case, a woman facing removal proceedings married a long-term
permanent resident.261 Her husband applied for an adjustment to her
residency status to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
and asked the IJ to stay the removal proceedings.262 The IJ granted
continuances but each time she had to appear in front of the IJ, the USCIS
had to delay the adjudication.263 Eventually, to expedite the process, the IJ
administratively closed the case.264 Because administrative closure was
appropriate and necessary in that case, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
attorney general’s argument that administrative closure was not appropriate
or necessary.265
C. Thorough Statutory Interpretation of Regulations That Do Not Use
Policy Terms
One decision interpreting Kisor thoroughly engaged in an interpretation of
a regulation that did not involve policy considerations. The Eleventh Circuit
in Callahan v. United States Department of Health and Human Services266
dealt with a regulatory ambiguity related to the requirements for altering the
procedure for receiving livers for transplant.267 The court recognized that
the “the nation’s policy for allocating donated livers hangs in the balance.”268
In short, the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 requires the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to regulate the Organ
Procurement and Transplant Network (OPTN),269 run by the United Network
for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a private nonprofit responsible for the
coordination of America’s organ transplant system.270 The HHS had
promulgated regulations regarding the process the OPTN must follow to
change the procedures for receiving a liver for transplant.271
The current liver-allocation policy distributes livers based on two
regions—eleven groups of states and “Donation Service Areas” (DSAs),
which are fifty-eight irregular geographical locations.272 Because of
criticisms from the DSAs, UNOS ventured to change the procedure for liver
donations.273 A specialized committee within the UNOS presented two
options for allocating livers and the UNOS board selected one of those
261. Id. at 293.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.; see also id. at 294 (citing In re Rajah, 25 I. & N. Dec. 127, 135 n.10 (B.I.A. 2009)
for the proposition that administrative closure is appropriate in a removal proceeding when
the undocumented immigrant seeks visa approval).
266. 939 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2019).
267. Id. at 1253.
268. Id. at 1257. The court certainly recognized the policy implications of its decision and
the policy decisions that go into rules for liver transplants. Id.
269. Id. at 1254.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1255.
273. Id.
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options.274 The proposed changed retained the use of DSAs but limited their
effect on liver allocation.275
Disappointed with the result, detractors of the new policy asked the HHS
secretary to suspend it and instruct the UNOS to reconsider.276 The secretary
then instructed the UNOS to adopt a policy that eliminated the use of
DSAs.277
The UNOS then proposed two new policies.278 Its advisory committee
supported one policy and the board chose to implement the other.279 Again,
detractors of the new policy asked the secretary to suspend the new policy.280
The secretary refused, and hospitals and individuals waiting for liver
transplants filed suit, principally arguing that the secretary violated pertinent
regulations.281
The regulation has two subsections that impose procedural
requirements.282 Because the regulations are complicated and central to the
case, they are reproduced here, as written in Callahan:
(b) The [OPTN] Board of Directors shall:
(1) Provide opportunity for the OPTN membership and other interested
parties to comment on proposed policies and shall take into account the
comments received in developing and adopting policies for
implementation by the OPTN; and
(2) Provide to the Secretary, at least 60 days prior to their proposed
implementation, proposed policies it recommends to be enforceable
under § 121.10 (including allocation policies). These policies will not
be enforceable until approved by the Secretary. The Board of Directors
shall also provide to the Secretary, at least 60 days prior to their
proposed implementation, proposed policies on such other matters as
the Secretary directs. The Secretary will refer significant proposed
policies to the Advisory Committee on Organ Transplantation
established under § 121.12, and publish them in the Federal Register
for public comment. The Secretary also may seek the advice of the
Advisory Committee on Organ Transplantation established under
§ 121.12 on other proposed policies, and publish them in the Federal
Register for public comment. . . .283

The plaintiffs argued that the secretary violated the regulations because he
did not refer this “significant proposed policy” to the advisory committee and
publish the policy in the Federal Register.284 The plaintiff believed that a
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See id. (stating that the plaintiffs disfavored the rule because they wanted the UNOS
to eliminate a DSA-based system).
277. Id. at 1256.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 1258.
282. Id.
283. See id.
284. Id.
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policy which fundamentally transforms procedures for liver transplants is
clearly “significant.”285
The HHS did not disagree.286 Instead, it argued that the “significant
review” requirement is only triggered (1) when the OPTN recommends that
the policy should be enforceable or (2) when the policy relates to “such other
matters as the Secretary directs.”287 Therefore, the sole interpretive question
was this: does the secretary need to refer all significant proposed policies to
the Federal Register or only those that (1) the OPTN board recommends to
be enforceable or (2) pertain to a matter the secretary directed?288
The court cited Kisor for the proposition that agencies deserve deference
only after courts “exhaust” the tools of statutory interpretation.289 Because
the agency’s reading was the better one, it did not apply Auer deference.290
It first analyzed the structure of the regulations.291 Based on the “scope-ofsubparts”292 canon, the court held that the “significant proposed policy”
requirement triggers only when the circumstances in the same subsection
occur.293
After analyzing the regulation’s structure, the court focused on the text of
subpart (2).294 The court held the subsection “acted like a funnel.”295 The
first two sentences described two contexts, and the “significant proposed
policy” requirement could only be triggered in those contexts.296 Therefore,
the court concluded that the regulation was not ambiguous and held that the
secretary did not need to refer the policy to the Federal Register. In doing
so, the court also raised and rejected the arguments the plaintiffs made, unlike
the courts in Trawler and Wolfington.297
IV. RESOLUTION OF DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF KISOR
In this Part, this Note explains how the courts in Trawler, Wolfington, and
Romero misapplied Kisor in different ways. The courts in Trawler and
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1259.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See id. at 1260 (The canon states that “material within an indented subpart relates only
to that subpart.” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 156 (2012))).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See id. at 1261 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the significant proposed policy
clause, when read in isolation, supports their proposition because regulations are to be read in
context). The court also rejected the defendant’s argument regarding the “presumption of
consistent usage.” Id. at 1262. The plaintiffs argued the defendant’s construction gave
“significant proposed policies” a narrower meaning than in the rest of the regulations. Id. But
the court held that the canon must “yield[] to context” and, in this context, the opening
sentences of the regulation narrowed the scope of its effect. See id.
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Wolfington underanalyzed the respective regulations and, by doing so,
ignored Justice Kagan’s prescription that courts must engage in thorough
analysis before concluding that a regulation is genuinely ambiguous. Then,
this Note explains why the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Callahan is a model
for how lower courts should interpret Kisor. This Note explains why lower
courts still employ a disuniform application of Auer deference, even though
the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the doctrine in Kisor. Finally, this
Note offers its own interpretation for the best reading of Kisor.
A. The Eastern District of North Carolina and the Third Circuit
Improperly Underanalyzed the Respective Regulations
1. The Eastern District of North Carolina
The court’s primary error in Trawler was that it required the plaintiff to
“unambiguously foreclose” the agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation.298 Kisor held that, to determine whether a regulation is genuinely
ambiguous, courts must rigorously interpret the regulation as if there is no
deference regime to rely on.299 For a normal interpretative question, one side
does not need to convince the judge that their interpretation is
“unambiguously” correct but only that it is more favorable, no matter how
slightly.300 Therefore, the existence of the deference regime influenced how
the court performed its regulatory analysis.
Moreover, the court at best modestly engaged in regulatory
interpretation.301 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument in one sentence,
simply because the regulations did not cross-reference the regulations that
the agency cited.302 The court did not analyze the regulation’s text, structure,
or history and did not use any other interpretive canon.303 It did not try to
analyze the regulation cited by the agency in conjunction with those cited by
the plaintiff because even doing so would not “unambiguously foreclose” the
agency’s position.304
But, as stated, Kisor requires judges to get into the weeds of regulatory
interpretation if doing so would reveal a legal answer to an interpretive
problem.305 The Trawler court’s unwillingness to do so suggests it
misunderstood the new requirements that Kisor set forth to find that a
regulation is genuinely ambiguous.

298. See supra Part III.A.1.
299. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019).
300. Id. at 2429–30 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
301. See Trawler Carolina Lady, Inc. v. Ross, No. 4:19-CV-19, 2019 WL 3213537, at *13
(E.D.N.C. July 16, 2019).
302. See supra Part III.A.1.
303. See supra Part III.A.1.
304. See supra Part III.A.1.
305. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
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2. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit similarly failed to analyze Regulation Z.306 First, it
concluded that the agency’s interpretation of the regulation deserved
deference before it ever analyzed the regulation itself.307 As in Trawler, this
ignores the responsibility of lower courts to interpret the regulation as if no
deference regime existed.308
But even worse, the Third Circuit did not attempt to interpret the
regulation.309 It simply concluded that the regulation was ambiguous
because the statute did not define a “written agreement” and there were two
competing presumptions raised by the litigants.310 In Kisor, Justice Kagan
acknowledged that the practice of deferring to the agency’s position without
an independent analysis of the regulation’s meaning justified Kisor’s gripe
with Auer deference.311 Yet, that is the exact practice the Third Circuit
employed in this case.312 Surely, the practice that Kisor identified as
justifying recalcitrance to Auer deference cannot be the practice that Kisor
endorsed. The Third Circuit did not analyze the regulation “as if it had no
agency to rely on.”313
That practice can be characterized as “front-end ambiguity.”314 This
occurs when a court determines, just by comparing the competing regulatory
interpretations advanced by the litigants, a regulation is ambiguous.315 In
this scenario, the hypothetical court does not embark on an interpretive
journey because the mere existence of two different arguments suffices to
create the ambiguity required for Auer deference. This normally occurs
because a court anticipates a difficult interpretive problem. This is distinct
from “back-end ambiguity,”316 where a court concludes a regulation is
ambiguous only after it attempts to interpret the regulation and it cannot come
306. Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187, 204 (3d Cir.
2019).
307. Id.
308. See supra note 142.
309. Wolfington, 935 F.3d at 205.
310. Id.
311. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
312. Wolfington, 935 F.3d at 206.
313. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
314. This Note proposes this term.
315. A useful analogy is to contra proferentem in contract interpretation. See Ethan J. Leib
& Steve Thel, Contra Proferentem and the Role of the Jury in Contract Interpretation, 87
TEMP. L. REV. 771 (2015). Contra proferentem is an interpretive rule stating that ambiguities
will be read against the drafter. Despite the seemingly simple rule, there are ambiguities as to
when to apply the rule. Id. at 782. It can be applied (1) to resolve the contractual ambiguity
by itself, (2) as a tiebreaker, or (3) as one of the last interpretive factors the court considers
after it has already tried to otherwise resolve the ambiguity. Id. Similarly, Auer deference can
apply (1) before analyzing the regulation at all, (2) as a tiebreaker, or (3) after a court has tried
to interpret a regulation but cannot come to the answer. Considering the idea of a “tie” in legal
interpretation is wishful at best, see supra note 154 and accompanying text, and because Kisor
repudiated applying Auer deference without analyzing the underlying regulation, see supra
note 135, courts should only use Auer deference as a last resort after an independent analysis
of the regulation.
316. This Note proposes this term.
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to a definite answer about the regulation’s meaning. Justice Kagan
repudiated front-end ambiguity and instead held that a regulation can only be
genuinely ambiguous after the court tries to interpret the regulation but
cannot come to an answer.317 Yet, the Third Circuit erroneously adopted the
front-end model.
The Third Circuit also held that the agency’s interpretation of the
regulation satisfied step two of the Kisor test because the agency’s
interpretation was in the “zone of ambiguity.”318 But Justice Kagan made
clear that independent regulatory interpretation defines the contours of the
“zone of ambiguity” in step one.319 Because the court made no independent
step-one analysis, it improperly analyzed the agency’s interpretation in step
two.
When courts defer to an agency without performing independent
regulatory analysis, they relinquish judicial power to the executive branch.320
Justice Kagan held that Auer does not violate separation of powers principles
because the limits she placed on Auer deference empower courts to “retain a
firm grip on the interpretive function.”321 But it is hard to imagine how
courts retain that firm grip when they, like the Third Circuit, choose to defer
to an agency without independently analyzing the regulation.
Even so, the Third Circuit did correctly interpret Kisor to require respect
for an agency’s policy discretion.322 In Kisor, Justice Kagan justified Auer
on those precise grounds.323 But Kisor limits the situations where agencies
receive deference, and the Third Circuit did not faithfully consider whether
the first test was met—whether the regulation was genuinely ambiguous.324
B. The Fourth Circuit, in Determining the Regulations Were
Unambiguous, Invaded the Attorney General’s Policy Discretion
The Fourth Circuit applied Kisor incorrectly for the opposite reason than
the courts in Trawler and Wolfington: it prevented the attorney general from
exercising his policy discretion.325
Words like “appropriate” and
“necessary” in regulations are policy-laden terms, and those terms rarely
have a “plain meaning,” as Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence made clear.326
When courts use plain meaning to disagree with an agency as to whether an
action is “appropriate” or “necessary,” that disagreement resembles policy
more than law. And that disagreement is more appropriate in State Farm
317. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Even if a court properly adopts the frontend model, it is still unclear how ambiguous a regulation must be to deserve Auer deference.
318. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
319. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416 (2019).
320. See supra Part I.C.
321. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
322. Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187, 204 (3d Cir.
2019).
323. See supra Part II.B.
324. See supra Part II.C.
325. See supra Part III.B.
326. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2448–49 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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review than Auer deference. To borrow a phrase used by Justice Kagan, the
regulations in Romero sounded more in “policy than in law.”327 That is,
“appropriate” and “necessary” are not terms subject to a textual gloss.328
Factually, the attorney general’s reading of the regulation was itself
grounded in policy.329
His precedential decision concluded that
administrative closures delay removal proceedings and benefit
undocumented immigrants and the use of closures skyrocketed after 2011.330
Moreover, the attorney general pointed out that most administratively closed
cases are never reopened, which effectively allows undocumented
immigrants to permanently stay in the country.331 In response, the Fourth
Circuit never considered these points raised by the attorney general.332 It
merely identified one instance in which the practice was helpful—where an
undocumented immigrant, during deportation proceedings, applied for a
visa.333 Based on that narrow situation, the court concluded that
administrative closure could theoretically be “appropriate” or “necessary”
textually.334
However, the attorney general acknowledged that, in limited instances,
administrative closure could be helpful, but that the cost of the procedure
outweighed its benefits.335 This resembles the cost-benefit analysis that
Justice Kagan referenced in Kisor regarding the issue of comparable lines of
sight for the disabled in arenas.336 There, the Court allowed the pertinent
agency to engage in its own cost-benefit analysis rather than textually
interpreting the word “comparable.”337 But the Fourth Circuit disallowed the
attorney general from doing the same. Just because administrative closure
could possibly be helpful in one scenario does not mean that the existence of
the practice, on balance, is appropriate or necessary. The attorney general
had to consider the costs of administrative closure (e.g., indefinite suspension
of cases) and the benefits of the practice (e.g., the narrow context cited by the
Fourth Circuit).338 By replacing that cost-benefit analysis with textual

327. Id. at 2413 (majority opinion). Specifically, Justice Kagan said the cost-benefit
analysis for deciding whether arenas should consider standing spectators when creating
“comparable lines of sight” for the disabled was a matter of policy, not law. Id.
328. Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 293 (2019).
329. In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 281 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
330. Id. at 271.
331. Id. at 272. It is hard to imagine how a practice that allows deportees to permanently
stay in the country is “appropriate or necessary” to effectuate removal proceedings.
332. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
335. See In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 291 (“By contrast, administrative closure has
produced a backlog all its own, with far fewer cases being recalendared than closed and some
cases suspended for decades.”). This excerpt inherently acknowledges that administrative
closure is sometimes effective but, overall, clogs IJs’ dockets and allows undocumented
immigrants to remain in the United States.
336. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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analysis, the Fourth Circuit usurped the policy discretion invested in the
attorney general by Congress.339
C. The Eleventh Circuit Properly Toed the Line Between Respect for
Policy Discretion and Rigorous Statutory Interpretation
Without question, the Eleventh Circuit confronted “hard interpretive
conundrums” relating to “complex rules.”340 In response, it analyzed the
regulation’s text, structure, and purpose to come to an answer about its
meaning.341 Therefore, it faithfully followed Kisor in that it did not
“reflexively” apply Auer deference—it instead followed the “reviewing and
restraining functions” of the judiciary.342 By avoiding a reflexive application
of Auer deference, the Eleventh Circuit avoided the very practice that gave
James Kisor the “grist” for his complaints about Auer deference.343
Moreover, in rejecting the application of Auer deference, the Eleventh
Circuit did not encroach upon the HHS’s policy discretion. After all, the
regulation covered “significant proposed policies.”344 As in Romero, it may
have been improper for the Eleventh Circuit to embark on a textual analysis
of the term “significant,” as that term is really a placeholder for the agency’s
policy discretion.345 But the court did not decide whether or not the proposed
policy was “significant”; instead, it decided under what circumstances the
secretary must refer significant proposed policies to the Federal Register for
public comment.346 This was a purely “legal” question and not an ad hoc
judicial determination of whether the proposed policy was “significant.”347
D. Explaining Kisor’s Divergent Interpretation: A Problem with Auer
Itself
This Note highlighted different ways that courts have applied Auer
deference in the months following Kisor.348 Some courts still reflexively
apply Auer deference, while others have not heeded Kisor’s holding
regarding respect for an agency’s policy discretion.349 This section offers
explanations for the divergence among courts and offers an opinion for the
best way to read Kisor.
Kisor, and the larger issue of deference to administrative agencies, will
always be subject to disparate application because of two competing values:
the duty of the judiciary to “say what the law is” and Congress’s intent to
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
2019).
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2413.
Callahan v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 939 F.3d 1241, 1253 (11th Cir.
See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2449 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
See Callahan, 939 F.3d at 1258.
Id.
See supra Part III.
See supra Parts III.B–C.
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delegate policymaking authority to an agency. Courts that do not rigorously
interpret a regulation before applying deference tend only to cite propositions
from Kisor that reflect congressional intent. For example, the Third Circuit’s
opinion in Wolfington, perhaps the opinion with the lowest threshold for
ambiguity, only cited references to Kisor’s holding about policy
judgments.350 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Romero v. Barr focused on
quoting and referencing the portions of Kisor that prescribe thorough
statutory interpretation.351 The court never referenced the parts of Kisor that
counsel respect and deference to an agency’s policy decisions.352 Moreover,
as a matter of common sense, Kisor is difficult to interpret because each of
the three concurring opinions offers a different opinion as to the meaning of
the majority and plurality opinions.353
Many issues that reach the Supreme Court involve a doctrine that has two
or more competing values. But Auer deference is unique because the
competing values determine whether to apply the doctrine, not the content of
the doctrine itself.354 The first step to determine whether to apply the
doctrine rests on a subjective determination—whether a regulation is
“ambiguous.”355 And, as stated, the Supreme Court has never tried to define
“ambiguity” for these purposes.
This problem, the lack of a definition for ambiguity, is the ultimate barrier
to an effective deference regime. Even if all courts heeded the instruction in
Kisor to empty their legal toolkits, there is no guidance on what to do after
the toolkits are empty. Even if courts heed the new limitations on Auer
deference that Kisor imposed, the lack of definition of “ambiguity” will still
prevent the uniform application of Auer deference. As long as the Court
remains silent on this issue, litigants can expect unpredictability in the
application of Auer deference.356
E. Toeing the Line: The Proper Way to Interpret Kisor
How then shall we interpret Kisor? Admittedly, Justice Kagan repeatedly
cabined the decision’s change on Auer deference.357 But the fundamental
phrase from the opinion—“genuine ambiguity”—is unprecedented in case
350. See Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187, 204 (3d
Cir. 2019).
351. See supra note 255. Selective quotation or citation of different principles of Auer
deference was a problem before Kisor. See Kevin O. Leske, Splits in the Rock: The Conflicting
Interpretations of the Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 66
ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 805 (2014) (stating that different circuits quote different parts of the rule
statement from Seminole Rock).
352. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
353. See Schofield v. Saul, 950 F.3d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Kisor’s majority
opinion, Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, and Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence to show how
Kisor left the state of Auer deference undefined).
354. Kavanaugh, supra note 150, at 2134.
355. Id.
356. See id. at 2135 n.88 (explaining that few judges and scholars engage with the threshold
problem of what constitutes ambiguity).
357. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2019).
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law about Auer deference.358 The Court’s iteration of Auer in Kisor
fundamentally shifts from the iteration of the rule in Decker.359 Justice
Anthony Kennedy stated that Auer deference can apply even if the agency’s
interpretation is not the best.360 But the Court in Kisor stated that Auer
deference is warranted only if there is “no single right answer.”361 Logically,
if Kisor held that Auer deference is only appropriate if there is no right
answer to an interpretative question, then a court cannot defer to an agency
if the agency’s interpretation is not the best one.362 Therefore, it is best to
conceive Kisor as a shift from the iteration in Decker to some extent.363
But the question is to what extent Kisor shifts from the iteration in Decker.
If Auer deference is only applied when a court is otherwise convinced that
the agency’s interpretation is superior, then it makes no difference in any
case.364 For Auer deference to have vitality, it must be applied in situations
where a court recognizes that the agency’s interpretation is inferior to that of
its adversary.365 It would be improper to interpret Kisor to limit Auer
deference to a meaningless doctrine after the Court took the opportunity to
justify and uphold it.366
The best reading of Kisor is one that modifies the rule from Decker to the
extent that the agency’s interpretation is grounded in legal interpretation. If
an agency has an inferior legal interpretation of a regulation, courts should
never defer to it, even if the interpretive process leading to the right answer
is long and exacting.367 However, if an agency’s interpretation of a
regulation is based in policy,368 and the policy it advances seems worse or
disfavorable to the policy advanced by its adversary, courts should
nonetheless defer to the agency. An interpretation of Kisor needs to reconcile
the need for rigorous interpretation of regulations with the need to give
This
appropriate deference to an agency’s policy discretion.369
understanding of Kisor respects the distinction Justice Kagan reinforced

358. Id. at 2416.
359. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
361. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
362. If a court concludes that an agency’s interpretation is inferior, then it has in fact come
to an answer.
363. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
364. See id. at 2430 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
365. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
367. See supra Part II.B. “It is not immediately apparent why a court should ever accept
the judgment of an executive agency on a question of law. . . . [T]o say that [an agency’s
view], if at least reasonable, will ever be binding—that is, seemingly, a striking abdication of
judicial responsibility.” Scalia, supra note 149, at 513–14.
368. One way to recognize that regulatory interpretation involves policy choices is if the
resolution requires cost-benefit analysis, see supra note 117 and accompanying text, or if the
regulation uses broad phrases like “reasonable,” which allows the agency to pick among
various permissible policy choices. See Kavanaugh, supra note 150, at 2154–55.
369. See supra Parts II.B–C.
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between law and policy while retaining the doctrine’s vitality and
relevance.370
Moreover, this interpretation avoids the problem of the term “ambiguous”
having no definition. Since Auer deference will never be applied to legal
questions, courts will return to their normal interpretive function. Normally,
courts use the tools of statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of a
statute or regulation. They do not have to decide the overarching question of
whether the provision being interpreted is ambiguous.371 Nor should they.
The duty of the judiciary is to “say what the law is,” not to say “whether or
not the law is ambiguous.”372 Instead, if the preferability of an agency’s
policy choice is ambiguous, courts should freely defer to them.
This interpretation also fits quite neatly with the cases previously
discussed. The Eastern District of North Carolina and the Third Circuit
improperly deferred to legal arguments, while the Eleven Circuit performed
its own independent legal analysis.373 The Fourth Circuit refused to defer to
policy arguments, which should receive the most deference under Kisor.374
What constitutes “law” versus “policy” is where the struggle in lower
courts should exist because, while Justice Kagan proffered that distinction,
she offered no guiding principle for the two concepts.375 The distinction is
easier to understand in theory than in application. After all, modes of
statutory interpretation include considering a statute or regulation’s policy
purpose. And Justice Kavanaugh’s suggestion that courts should give policy
discretion to agencies for regulations that use broad terms like “reasonable”
is a useful starting point but not the entire answer.376 When a court
determines whether to apply deference, it must consider the fine distinction
between policy and law without a clear definition from the Supreme Court
about their meanings.
CONCLUSION
The issue of whether to apply Auer deference will continue to plague
courts and litigants alike. While Kisor presented an opportunity to clarify
the doctrine, early decisions interpreting the decision cast that hope into
doubt. That is because lower courts, to uniformly apply deference regimes,
need precedent on (1) how much ambiguity is necessary for a regulation to
370. See supra Part II.B. Justice Kavanaugh makes a very similar point in his 2016 book
review. See Kavanaugh, supra note 150, at 2154 (arguing that agencies should receive
deference when regulations use phrases like “reasonable” or “appropriate” but not when the
interpretive question involves “a specific statutory term or phrase”).
371. See Kavanaugh, supra note 150, at 2144 (“[J]udges should strive to find the best
reading of the statute. They should not be diverted by an arbitrary initial inquiry into whether
the statute can be characterized as clear or ambiguous. In other words, we can try to make
sure that judges do not—or at least only rarely—have to ask whether a statute is clear or
ambiguous in the course of interpreting it.”).
372. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
373. See supra Parts IV.A, C.
374. See supra Part IV.B.
375. See supra Part II.B.
376. See Kavanaugh, supra note 150, at 2153–54.
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be “genuinely ambiguous” and (2) the distinction between law and policy.
Without further input from the Supreme Court on those two critical issues,
Auer deference will be an uncontrollable doctrine that perpetually subjects
litigants to uncertainty.

